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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ni. A. SHAW, FRANK ARMSTRONG, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
CASE NO.
7380

vs.
S.A.LT LAKE COUNTY, a
municipal corporation, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

Appellants' Brief
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The plaintiffs in 'this action are all owners or residents of homes situate in a certain area of Salt Lake
County which the plaintiffs designated the ''Cottonwood
District." (Tr. 1.) The plaintiffs assigned certain arbitrary bounds to that district so referred to as follows:
''From Holladay on the north to and including the homes on the south side of 6200 South on
the south, and from Wasatch Boulevard on the
east, to and including the homes on the west side
of Highland Drive on the west." (Tr. 1-2).
1
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At the time of the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs
obtained a temporary restraining order, restraining the
defendants from operating a gravel ~it which was loca~ed
within that described district. (Tr. 13-16).
Salt Lake, County had theretofore entered into a certain agreement of lease with one Edwin B. Harper and
his wife, whereby the County obtained a leasehold interest in a tract of ground for the purpose of mining and
processing gravel for the use of the County upon the
public roads in Salt Lake County maintained by the
County. (Tr. 1-2). Prior to the issuance of the temporary restraining order, Salt Lake County had placed
machinery and equipment upon the premises and had
. commenced operations for the extracting of gravel for
public road purposes. (Tr. 2). The County had further
planned to use a certain hot asphalt plant to further pre.pare road material for use upon the public roads a.nd had
I

purchased said plant. ( Tr. 241).
The defendants filed a demurred to plaintiffs' complaint, which, was both general and special in form, a.nd·
noticed the said demurrer for hearing at the time defendants were ordered to appear in connection with the temporary restraining order. {Tr. 12).

Upon the hearing

of the order to show cause, the defendants duly moved
the court for an order to vacate the temporary restraining order, which was theretofore issued ex parte. (Tr.12).
2
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The court overruled the demurrer (rrr. 30) and denied
the motion to vacate the temporary restraining order.
(Tr. 24). The ra.use was thereupon duly tried and the
rourt found that the proposed operations by the county
'Yould constitute a nuisance (Tr. 46-49) and made permanent its restraining order (Tr. 50-51).

STATE1\1ENT OF FJRRORS
1. That the court erred in overruling the defendants' demurrer.
2. That the court erred in denying defendants
motion to vacate the temporary restraining order.
3. That the court erred in finding that the operation
of defendants' proposed plant would be a nuisance.
4. That the court erred in permanently enjoining
the defendants from the operations referred to.

STATEJ\IENT OF J> ARTICULAR QUESTIONS
INVOLVED FOR DErrERMINATION
I. Whether an action of the kind brought by the
plaintiffs in this case may be maintained against Salt
Lake County or the named defendants as commissioners
.of Salt Lake County for the creation or maintenance by
the defendants of an alleged nuisance. Involved in this
general question are three particular questions:
a. vVhether Salt
ereign immunity as a
State of Utah which
against it of this kind
3

Lake County enjoys a SOVpolitical subdivision of the
precludes the maintenance
of action.
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b. Whether, assuming that such sovereign
immunity exists, there is any provision in the sta~
utes of the State of Utah which in any way modifies or effects that sovereign immunity so as to
authorize this kind of action to be maintained
against the defendants.
c. Whether, assuming that such sovereign
immunity exists, it is in any way affected by the
fact that the action is equitable in form and asks
an injunction against an alleged nuisance.
II. Whether, under the evidence before the court
in thi,s action, a nuisance as an inevitable result is estab-lished.
III. Whether, even assuming such nuisance to be
the result of the defendants' activities, all of such activities should be permanently enjoined under the facts and .
circumstances of this case.

ARGUMENT
I. Whether an action of the kind brought by the
plaintiffs in this case may be maintained against Salt
Lake County or the named defendants as commissioners
of Salt Lake County for the creation or maintenance by
the defendants of an alleged nuisance.
(a)

These questions were the basis of the defend-

ants' general demurrer, which demurrer "\\ras overruled
by the trial court herein. Considering those questions
in order, the first proposition is that the sovereign is
immune again~t any suit that has. not been authorized

4
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by that sovereign. We contend that that rule is too well
settled to be seriously questioned. The issue is whether
the county partakes of the sovereign immunity of the
state, or whether the county is a separate entity which
does ont enjoy that immunity. The constitution of th,t}
State of Utah rec.ognizes the several counties as "legal
subdivisions of this State," (Constitution of Utah, Article II, Section 1). The nature of the county in Utah was
further explained in the case of Emery County vs. Burresen, 14 Utah 328...t\.t page 330 of the Utah Report, the
court states :
''A county is one of the political divisions of
the state signifying the community clothed with
such extensive authority and political power as
may be deemed necessary by the superior controlling power of the state for the proper government
of its people residing within its borders and for a
proper administration of its local affairs.''
There a.re many other cases in surrounding jurisdictions holding that the county is an arm or auxiliary of
the state. In the ease of Roosevelt County vs. State
Board of Equalization, a case decided by the Montana
Supreme Court, and found reported in 162 Pacific 2nd,
at page 887, the court says in part :
''A county is but an agency or arm of the
state government, created, organized and existing
for civil and political purposes, particularly for
the purpose of administering locally the general
powers and policies of the state, and a.s a matter
of public convenience in the administration of the
government. It is generally a subordinate part of
the sovereignty of the state itself, and is not an
independent governmental entity.''
5
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Further cases in support of this proposition are: Commonwealth vs. Walker, 156 Atlantic 340, a Pennsylvania
case;· tha City of Pendleton vs. Umatilla County, Oregon,
241 Pacific 979; the City of Los Angeles vs. the County
of ~os Angeles, 77 Pacific 2nd, 138; Gayer vs. Whelan
District Attorney, 141 Pacific 2nd 514. In the last mentioned case which arose in the State of California, the

'

court says at page 516 of the Pacific report in part as
follows, "the county enjoys the same immunity from suit
and liabiilty as the state," citing the City of Los Angeles
vs. Los Angeles County, 72 Pacific 2nd 138, 113 ALR 370,
and Whittaker vs. the County of Tuolumne, 30 Pacific
1016. Our Supreme Court has referred to the question
of this immunity in the case of Lund vs. Salt Lake County, wherein it is said at page 515 of 200 Pacific, the
following:
''In support of the validity of plaintiffs alleged
third cause of action, counsel do not contend that
the county when acting in a governmental capacity, would be liable for the negligence of its officers
or agents for any injury occasioned by their negligence ; hence it is not necessary to envoke the
doctrine maintained with practical unanimity in
nearly every jurisdiction of the country, to the
effect that municipal corporations, especially
county organizations, are not liable in such cases
unless made so by express statute. Brief of respondents counsel filed in the case upon this point is
voluminous and conclusive.''
(b) The second question involved herein, is.
whether authority has been given by any statute of the
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State of Utah to maintain the action of the sort here
before the court. Defendants contend that there is no
statute here applicable. Subsection 1, of section 3, Chapter 4, Title 19, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, defines generally the po,ver of a county to ''sue and be sued.'' It
appears clear from the authorities that this statute
simply constitutes the county as an entity to sue or be
sued in those kind of actions in which the county is properly a plaintiff or defendant according to the other statutes of the state. A case so construing a similar statute
is Leanny Ys. Jefferson County, an Alabama case reported in 32 So. 2nd at page 542. At page 543 of the So.
Report, the court says in part as follows :
''Notwithstanding the provisions of Title 12·,
Section 3, Code, that a county is a body corporate
with power to sue and be sued in any court of record is nevertheless an arm of the state and is
subject to immunity from suit which the state has,
so long as it is engaged in governmental functions
as to which no statute authorizes suit."
Other Alabama cases to that affect are here cited.
In accord is the New Hampshire case of 0 'Brien vs.
Rockingham County reported in 120 Atlantic at page
254. In that case the court said in part at page 255 of
the Atlantic Report that a statute
''declaring them to be corporate cannot confer
upon them other powers or subject them to other
duties than those which are conferred and imposed either by express provisions of some statute or are implied from the general character and
design of such public corporations.'' (Citing
cases.)

7
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There is no other statute known to the defendants
which is in force in this state and which expresly refers
to the liability or non-liability of a county to suit. However, section 27, Chapter 3, Title 104, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, gives statutory consent to certain specially
designated actions which might under certain conditions
be brought against the State of Utah. This section does
not of course, authorize an action of the type now before
the court against the state or against the county. In the
absence of some other provisions specifically referring
to the county, defendants contend that this is the consent
and the only consent which is given to bring action against
the state itself, and the counties as subdivisions of the
state.
(c) Refering to the third question herein necessarily involved, defendants propose to discuss the question
of whether there is an exception to the sovereign immunity of the state's political subdivision based upon the fact
that a nuisance is claimed or that an injunction is the
type of relief sought. There would appear. from the reading of the text to be some conflict of authority on this
question. That apparent conflict of authority is noted in
20 CJS 1069, Section 216, as follows :
''Nuisances. Whether a county may or may
not be liable for the creation or maintenance of a
nuisance has been decided in accordance with the
rule prevailing in the particular jurisdiction as to
the liab~lity of ~ounties for torts generally, as discussed In Section 216 Supra; other authorities
~old that a county is immune from liability for
Its torts does not extend to the creation or main8
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tenance of a. nuisance and have granted injunctive
relief in favor of a private indiYidual as against
a county for a threatened nuisance.''
rrhe principal cases cited in the footnote, in support
of the proposition holding that it is immune from suit for
a threatened nuisance are Leibman vs. Richmond, 284
Pac. 731, 103 Cal. App. 354, and Jones vs. Jefferson
County, 89 So. 17 J, 206 Ala. 13. In the analysis of this
question defendants submit that it is perhaps important
that the functions, scope and size of counties varies
through the United States and that this court should
take judicial notice of the fact that the counties in the
western states differ in many particulars from counties
in other parts of the country. (104-46-1 sub. 8, U.C.A.
1943). The first mentioned case should be especially
persuasive since the statutes in the State of California
defining the county as a political subdivision are substantially the same as in the State of Utah, and since the
counties in the two. states are geographically and functionally similar. The cases which are cited in the text
at the page last mentioned in support of a contrary view,
do not distinguish between a city and a county with
regard to this liability. The earlier cases in the State
of Tennessee have indicated that injunctive relief as
against the county for a threatened nuisance, should be
granted. But the later Tennessee case of Odil vs. Maury
County, 136 So. West 2nd, page 500, seems to abandon
this rule, at least in certain circumstances. At page 501
of the report cited, the court refers to the general rule
of non-liability on the part of the County, and states:
9
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''this general rule applies to acts constituting nuisances," and cites in support of that statement many
cases which are in accord. It is submitted that there is no
valid reason for the distinction adhered to in some courts
between tort liability generally and liability for nuisances
alleged to be committed. The principal reasons for nonliability on the part of the county generally are illustrated by the following quotations:
'' This rule is the logical result of the 'vell
settled doctrine that the state ma.y not be sued
unless it consents thereto.'' - Larsen v. Yuma
County ,225 P. 1115, 1116, 26 Ariz. 367, 15 OJ page
569 note 63(a).
And the other reason :
"The absolution from liability of a county
* * * rests upon the ground that the county * * *
is simply a quasi corporation and not clothed with
full corporate po,vers. '' - Shirkey v. Keokuk
County, Iowa, 275 N.W. 706, 712, 225 Iowa 1159,
withdrawn except as reaffirmed and modified 281
N.W. 837, 225 Iowa 1159.
It is submitted that upon logic and principle the foregoing reasons apply with equal force whether the wrong
complained of is an alleged negligent tort or an alleged
nuisance.
II. Whether, under the evidence before the court
in this action, a nuisance as an inevitable result is established.
Referring· to the second question necessarily involved, the attention of the court is invited to the general
10
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statements of the texts as to the restraining of threatened or apprehended nuisances. 30 Am. Jur. at pages
417-418 section 431 reads in part as follows:
"But the general rule appears to be that an
injunction ''"'ill be granted when, and not unless,
the act or thing threatened or apprehended will
be a nuisance per se, or a nuisance will inevitably
or necessarily result from it. If the complainant's
right is doubtful, or the thing which it is sought
to restrain is not a nuisance per se and will not
necessarily become a nuisance, but may or may
not become such, depending on the use, manner of
operation, or other circumstances, equity will not
interfere.''
Numerous cases are cited in support of that general
proposition.· The evidence in this case, appellants believe,
establishes clearly that the question of whether the restraind operations would or \Vould not at any particular
time becomes a nuisance as 'veil as the extent of such
nuisanpe depends largely upon the force and direction of
wind currents in relation to the plaintiffs' residences and
the proposed site of operations. The evidence as to the
probable direction and force of the winds was conflicting.
The plaintiffs' evidence was non-expert and was based
on observa tioils of the plaintiffs, all of whom were lay
persons as far as physical sciences are concerned and
some testimony by the witness Butler. Defendants evidence was based on expert testimony and scientific facts
insofar as those facts "rere available. It is submitted
that the question of the effect of the wind is extremely
questionable and that in that respect, if in no other,
11
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plaintiffs have failed to show that a nuisance would
necessarily follow. The evidence of the plaintiffs with
regard to the alleged effect on foliage was based upon
certain tests made about December, 1927 in the eastern
part of the country. It is submitted that these tests are
too remote in time and distance to enable the court to
deetrmine as a fact that a nuisance in this regard would
necessarily follow from the conditions alleged to arise
from defendants proposed operations. The extent to
which the nuisances apprehended from proposed operations could be mini~ized or eliminated by the use of protective devices does not fully appear, but there is evidence that some, at least, of the threatened damage could
be eliminated or mini~zed through proper equipment
to collect dust from the planned operations. The permanent injunction issued by the trial court deprives the
defendants of any opportunity to determine by experiment what results will follow from the operations, and
in effect the trial court is making a decision as to scientific facts without, as appellants believe, any sufficient
evidence or information upon which to determine that
fact.
III. Whether, even assuming such nuisance to be
the result of the defendants' activities, all of such activities should be permanently enjoined under the facts and
circumstances of this case.
Another consideration is, of course, the public convenience and necessity resulting from the continuance of
the defendants activities as opposed to the nuisance to

12
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the plaintiffs, assuming thnt that nuisance will result .
.I\J 39 Am. J ur. page 471, section 195, appears the follo~1'
ing general statement:
''And \vhen the public welfare requires it a
nuisance may, for special purposes, be permitted.
Public. convenience or necessity may also be taken
into consideration in some cases in determining
\Yhether or not to grant equitable relief.''
It is submitted that Salt Lake County and all of the
residents therein, and all persons traveling through Salt
Lake County ha.Ye a direct and immediate interest in
proper maintenance and construction of the county roads.
It is further submitted that the taxpayers have a direct
and immediate interest in the costs of such construction
and maintenance and "\vill benefit from efficient preparation of road rna terials. The proper parties to determine
the most efficient and economical manner with which to
acquire road building materials are the duly elected c6mmissioners of Salt Lake County. On the other hand, the
damage, if any, to the majority of the plaintiffs is extremely remote and speculative. A few of the plaintiffs
reside in the immediate vicinity of the proposed operation but the majority live a considerable distance away
as will appear from the boundaries of the district in question, as set up by the plaintiffs. Weighing the eonvenience and necessity of the public as a whole against the
inconv~nience

and possible damage to some of the plain-

tiffs, it would seem that equitable relief should have been
withheld.

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is respectfully submitted that the permanent
injunction issuea by the trial court herein wa.s improperly
granted and that the same should be vacated and the
action dismissed with costs to the appellants.

'J

Respectfully submitted,

EDvVARD M. MORRISSEY,
County Attorney
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.
Chief Deputy Cownty Attorney

l

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for the Defendarnts
and the Appellants
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RECEIVED two copies of the foregoing brief this
----------------------------day of September, 1949.

·~.'

1

1

CRITCHLOW, WATSON, and
WARNOCK

By-.----.------.. ------.-----------.----.-----... ------Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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